Discussion: When I'm touching you...

 

I am impressed with the presentation from O'Regan. I must admit that his theory is so amazing that I was seriously considering that I may be wrong to choose to research about perception rather than Law, yet I had the same dream as him about building a true Robot that can "think".

It is always amazing to think about "I". The sense of this simple notion, is difficult enough to take thousands of years to look into it. I considered an integration of perception and effector could be an acceptable answer, though it is not. As stated by O'Regan, it is not something you can find in the brain or somewhere else, since it is neither the property of our nerve system nor of any object outside. It is nothing, yet we can "feel" it, describe it and even predict it. I must admit that he may be right, that "red" has nothing to do with perception, and so do when I feel "touched" by something.

However, it is still not the whole story.

Any perception could be a fake, as shown by synchronised stimulation or hypnosis. On the contrary, they are also truth for those who feel them since the Bodiliness and Grabiness hold true, as shown by Synaesthesia and Lucid Dreams. The problem we encounter here, is that the notion "I" (cogito) is not constructed by "I" (ergo) alone, thus we would have different stories told by different "I" or a great story composed by all the "I"s. The "sensorimotor theory" would not be completed before it takes the "multiple I" problem into consideration. Even though personality related problems have been mention in the slides, I found no enough discussion about them.

For example, why did I feel "touched" by the words of a pretty girl, while she actually did not meant it at all?

And that is the time when "language" problem becomes significant and, as stated by O'Regan, "hard". As revealed by the theory of Mirror Neurons, communication with language may actually work in a sensorimotor way, and that is why it was related to social cognition, and what exactly I'm trying to confirm.

Anyway, the "sensorimotor theory" is amazing and impressive, and may serve as a good alternative rather than traditional theory-theory and simulation theory.

Memory in dreams: fake or truth?

At the first, I must admit that I'm specialised in neither dream nor memory. What I'm desribe below is just my experiences.

Question: can we access our whole memory while dreaming?

I have a dream recently which I won't cover details here. What interested me is a pouch I own in reality. When I was dreaming, I strongly believed that it is used as a wallet, and I actually used it like a wallet in my dream.

However, in reality, though it do contains some unused coins, it is primarily used to keep important documents such as passport and other ID cards. You can imagine the size of such a pouch. Obviously it can never be used as a wallet. So how did I make such a mistake in dream?

Certainly our reasoning ability is limited in dream, though this time the problem seems to be related with memory solely. There is saying (Fruedian?) goes that the memory in dream is actually distorted. But I concern, at least for my case, the memory in dream was fake instead of just distorted. That is, I can not access parts of my memory while I was dreaming.

Finally, no matter the memory is distorted or fake, the mechanism of the distortion or falsification needs to be studied, not just the concepts.

Or go further: how can we know our memory is right for certain, without any distortion or falsification?

是什么令你我如此不同？

原文于2008.07.25发表于只谈思想。本文有删改。

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一台电脑换了多少零件之后，我们就可以把它看作一台新电脑？
一个人换了多少器官之后，我们就可以把他看作一个不同的人？

从微观上说，生物的DNA存在个体差异，也因此而导致我们最终成为不同的个体。但是，假如个体差异仅仅采用这种分子生物学上的概念来解释的话，那么也就等于承认，假如有两个个体的DNA完全相同，他们也就不应该存在个体差异。绵羊“多利”的实验以事实证明了这种说法的谬误（虽然不是那么完备的证明）。很显然，多利的亲代和子代的DNA是完全相同的，但由于其成长环境以及经历的不同，其性格、思考方式、喜好等等肯定会有所不同。没有什么“DNA决定论”。

换个角度来思考，假如我把我身上的各个器官，逐个用你身上的器官来替换，那么，要替换到什么程度，我将“不再是我”？又要替换到什么程度，我将“变成了你 ”？我想大多数人都会同意这样的看法：换胳膊换腿倒还好分辨，换到心脏的时候就不好说了，要是换到脑子，那就完全不同了。

因为受到源远流长的文化熏陶，“换心”对于大多数中国人来说，都是充满疑惑的，而且也不时有“心脏移植手术导致性格改变”之类的报道出现。但是大家也都不得不承认，这种观点缺乏足够的证据支持，而且大多数的心脏移植手术都没有这类神奇的后遗症。而对于脑子来说，几乎所有人都得承认，如果我们进行“大脑移植手术”的话，恐怕不会那么顺利。

这种现象当然十分有意思。由于对于任何一种生物，用“软件”、“硬件”这样的概念都是很不尊重的。所以我打算用“记忆”来表述我的疑问：一个“失忆”的人，在多大的程度上还能算是原先的他？

在 PSP版的《叛逆的鲁鲁修》中，主人公虽然失去了记忆，在行为方面却仍然保留了原先的记忆，而且时不时还会被“记忆的碎片”冲击一下子。像这种情况，通常表明此人大脑中的记忆链接部分中断，存在通过强烈刺激重新恢复记忆的可能性。那么，假如此人在恢复记忆之前做了些什么事的话（例如向某mm告白），在他恢复记忆之后，我们能否把这些事情看作是同一个人做的？

再如TV版的《叛逆的鲁鲁修》，莎莉被鲁鲁修抹去了“关于鲁鲁修”的一切记忆，后来却因为残留的日记残片而得知了部分重要的事实。但是重要的一点是，莎莉对鲁鲁修的感情并没有回来。看来，“爱”并不是那么简单的东西。那么，失去了对鲁鲁修的“爱”的莎莉，还算不算原来的她？

同样的事例也可以在电影版《尼伯龙根的指环》中找到。男主人公喝下“忘情水”之后并没有丢失任何记忆，所失去的仅仅是对女王的“爱”而已。那么，对于其后其所做的事情，我们能在多大程度上认为是他的本意？假定男主角及时得知了“忘情水”的真相并告知女王从而得以幸免一死，但同时男主角又绝对无法恢复对女王原先的感情，那么他在多大程度上还是自己？（影片中为了避免此类探讨，在剧终让男主角恢复了对女王的爱。但这并非总会发生。）

现在让我们来看看我们自己。每天，我们都在改变。我们总是记住一些新的东西，同时也在忘记一些旧的东西。每天一觉醒来时，你是否能感觉到自己与昨天的自己并不相同？你是否会觉得，“每天都是一个全新的我”？

与此同时，我们的感情也在每时每刻发生着微妙的改变。我们对同一事物的看法，没有任意的两个时刻会完全相同。正如诡辩学派的著名言论：你甚至一次也不能踏入同一条河流。也许，我们甚至一次都不曾成为“自己”。